Introduction
Türkiye is a country that frequently faces natural disasters and especially earthquakes. This geographical reality necessitates Türkiye to continuously review and improve its disaster management system. After the 1999 Marmara Earthquake, problems such as lack of coordination and multi-headedness in disaster management were clearly revealed, and in order to solve these problems, AFAD was established in 2009 and disaster management was gathered under a single roof. However, the earthquakes that occurred on 6 February 2023 in Kahramanmaraş as the epicentre showed that serious problems still exist in practice despite the improvements made in the legislation. This situation once again reveals the vital importance of coordination in disaster management. Establishing and maintaining a coordinated disaster management system with the participation of all stakeholders of the society is essential to minimise the impact of future disasters.
This study analyses the coordination problems in the first 72 hours after the earthquakes and the losses caused by these problems. The aim of the study is to identify the current problems in Türkiye’s disaster management system, to analyse the origins and consequences of these problems, and to propose solutions to minimise the effects of similar disasters in the future. In this framework, the study addresses how all stakeholders involved in the disaster management process – public institutions, non-governmental organisations, private sector and citizens – can be integrated more effectively and how coordination can be strengthened. In addition, the study provides concrete recommendations on which strategic steps should be taken to increase Türkiye’s disaster management capacity.
The earthquakes on 6 February 2023 in the epicentre of Pazarcık and Elbistan/ Kahramanmaraş, which affected 11 provinces, painfully demonstrated how inadequate the improvements made in the legislation were in practice. Why serious coordination problems were experienced in search and rescue and in meeting basic needs after these earthquakes, and what deficiencies emerged in the provision of vital services were evaluated in the light of interviews with civil defence and disaster management experts, earthquake victims and civil society representatives, and public information.
23 Years in Earthquake Management: The Adventure of Legal Regulations
In 2009, an important turning point was experienced in disaster management in Türkiye. Prior to 2009, disaster management was carried out through a tripartite structure, which consisted of the General Directorate of Civil Defence, the General Directorate of Disaster Affairs and the General Directorate of Emergency Management of Türkiye. However, after the 1999 Marmara Earthquake, this structure was criticised for lack of coordination and confusion of authority. As a result, in 2009, disaster management was gathered under a single roof and Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD) was established under the Prime Ministry. With this structure, disaster response services started to be managed from a single centre and Provincial Directorates of Disaster and Emergency and Search and Rescue Teams were established. In 2018, the organisation was affiliated to the Ministry of Interior with the Presidential Decree No. 4. The decree published in the Official Gazette defined AFAD’s central and provincial units. The duties of the Presidency are defined as the effective execution of disaster and emergency and civil defence services, coordination of preparedness and risk reduction activities, management of response and recovery processes and coordination of domestic and international humanitarian aid operations.
In 2014, Türkiye Disaster Response Plan (TAMP) was developed. TAMP was prepared to define the roles of working groups and coordination units that will take part in disaster and emergency response. The plan aimed to manage all services in an integrated and modular structure. One of the important elements supporting TAMP is the 27 Regional Disaster Logistics Warehouses and 54 Logistics Support (Pocket) Warehouses established across Türkiye to ensure the timely delivery of temporary shelter materials that will be needed in case of a disaster. From these warehouses, lorries can be prepared to depart within minutes in case of need. 82,835 tents, 48,979 beds, 122,148 blankets, 70,072 pillow-sheet sets, 19,859 kitchen sets and mobile toilets are stocked in these warehouses. This system is critical for a fast and effective response after a disaster. Updated in 2022, TAMP assigned the coordination of disaster and emergency services to AFAD.
AFAD has implemented a system called Disaster Management and Decision Support System (AYDES) in order to realise rapid response and resource management effectively in case of a disaster. AYDES is a web-based application built on geographical information systems that enables instant data flow and coordination. This system also manages processes such as the rapid procurement and distribution of the materials needed during a disaster from logistics warehouses.
Under the management of AFAD, all structures required for the authorisation of service groups according to their duties and responsibilities, coordination of search and rescue teams and meeting the needs in an orderly manner have been established and important steps have been taken in terms of legislation. This system provides an effective framework for post-disaster search and rescue and relief processes in case coordination is ensured.
“The First 72 Hours of the Earthquake: What Happened During the Crisis?”
On 6 February 2023, Kahramanmaraş Pazarcık and Elbistan earthquakes clearly demonstrated that the improvements made in the legislation were insufficient in practice. Why were there such serious problems in search and rescue and meeting basic needs after these earthquakes, especially in the field of coordination? Which coordination deficiencies were experienced in the vital services to be provided after the earthquakes? In order to find answers to these questions, the following assessments have been made in the light of interviews with former government officials, earthquake victims and representatives of non-governmental organisations who are experts in the field of civil defence and disaster management, as well as the news reflected in the public opinion:
- During the most critical days of the earthquake, there was a serious coordination problem between the crisis management centres and rescue and first aid committees in the provinces. According to the legislation, it is the responsibility of AFAD to identify the personnel, equipment and materials required to carry out search and rescue operations, to assign the relevant service groups and to ensure coordination between the groups. However, major organisational problems emerged among these service groups during the earthquake. Providing timely information to the central authority after a disaster and rapid convening of crisis management centres are of vital importance to minimise delays and confusion in response processes. Unfortunately, after the earthquake, these centres and committees could not convene on time and could not work effectively. In fact, due to political concerns, it was observed that even the people in critical positions could not be contacted at the right time. A concrete example of this situation is the fact that the Metropolitan Mayor from the opposition party, who is a natural member of the Provincial Disaster and Emergency Coordination Board in Hatay, could not be contacted either at local or central level.
- Since the necessary coordination could not be ensured after the earthquake, AYDES developed by AFAD in 2013 could not be used effectively. AYDES is a web-based application designed to effectively manage resources and accelerate decision support mechanisms in disasters and emergencies. In 2019, the functioning of AYDES was tested in a national drill on a 7.5 magnitude earthquake scenario centred on Kahramanmaraş and the drill was publicised as successful. It was claimed that the exercise ensured the coordination of service groups at local and national level without any problems. However, in the real earthquake in 2023, all the steps that were considered successful in the exercise turned into failures due to the lack of coordination in the most critical first 72 hours and caused a major destruction. The ineffective use of AYDES in this process caused serious setbacks in the identification of needs, resource management and response processes.
- The lack of coordination in the field of search and rescue after the earthquakes caused an increase in loss of life. When the legislative arrangements are analysed; the basic philosophy of the existing response and emergency aid plans for disasters in Türkiye is that the first response to the disaster should be made from the disaster area. However, the search and rescue teams under the main coordination of AFAD were delayed to intervene in the region during the most critical hours of the earthquake. Although this delay was tried to be overcome by the non-governmental organisations in the service group on their own initiative, it was observed that the necessary legal permissions were not granted to these groups. Although there were no bureaucratic processes required for the transportation of volunteer rescue and first aid teams organised by the NGOs in the service group to the disaster area, unlike official groups, (although they could easily mobilise to the earthquake zone), AFAD did not give approval and authorisation for search and rescue services in the region. As a justification, it was stated that it was necessary to wait for the intervention of the search and rescue teams of AFAD to the region first. After the arrival of search and rescue teams to the region, it was emphasised that all actions and activities involving intervention services should wait for approval from AFAD Headquarters, and the activities could not be started until the approval was received. The procedures of giving approval and waiting for approval for the activation of a service area of fundamental importance such as search and rescue after the earthquake are the subject of a separate discussion. However, it is not understood that approval is expected at the national level instead of Provincial Disaster and Emergency Coordination Boards and Provincial AFAD Centres at the local level. This situation delayed the search and rescue interventions in the moments that are essential for the maintenance of life after the earthquake and this situation caused an increase in the loss of life.
- The delay in the dispatch of military units to the region after the earthquake led to serious coordination deficiencies in search and rescue operations. The EMASYA Protocol (an abbreviated version of the phrase “Safety, Security and Assistance”) allowed the military to intervene in urban social incidents and natural disasters (floods, fires, earthquakes, etc.). The protocol allowed the military to provide assistance under civilian control in the absence of sufficient civilian response forces, and the military could take action without the permission of the governor. However, in 2010, this protocol was abolished due to concerns that it could pave the way for a coup d’état, and the military’s intervention in natural disasters was subsequently made subject to the permission of the governor’s office. This resulted in governors not taking the initiative and delaying military deployment. On the second day of the earthquake, 3500 and then 4500 soldiers were dispatched to the region after criticism. However, this number was very insufficient compared to the Marmara earthquake. While there were 0.69 soldiers per square kilometre in the Marmara earthquake, this ratio was calculated as 0.03 soldiers in the Kahramanmaraş earthquake. This low ratio caused search and rescue activities to remain inadequate, the earthquake victims could not reach the aid and there were problems in the coordination of foreign teams.
- During the most critical hours after the earthquake, serious organisational problems were experienced in the delivery of vital supplies from AFAD’s logistics warehouses to those in need. Although there are 27 Regional Disaster Logistics Warehouses and 54 Logistics Support Warehouses across Türkiye, in the affected provinces of Kahramanmaraş, Adıyaman, Diyarbakır and Kilis, these warehouses were not opened on time and the necessary supplies were not distributed. Smaller logistics support warehouses in Hatay, Gaziantep, Şanlıurfa and Malatya faced similar problems. Due to these shortages, needed supplies were provided by citizens from surrounding provinces, civil society organisations and representatives of the private sector. The inability to distribute the supplies in AFAD’s warehouses on time caused a major setback in the post-earthquake response.
- After the earthquake, serious coordination problems were experienced in the sorting and distribution of aid materials sent from other Turkish cities and abroad. According to TAMP, this process should be carried out under the main coordination of the Ministry of Interior and AFAD. However, major problems emerged in the acceptance, registration, storage and distribution of the aid. While most of the aid was focused on provincial centres, rural areas were neglected. The lack of organisation in the provision of clothing and food aid prevented these items from reaching those in need in a timely manner and led to the waste of some aid.
Practices such as keeping aid trucks waiting in the region for a long time and changing the informative pennants on the trucks due to political concerns delayed the timely distribution of aid. In addition, the late arrival of hygiene supplies and mobile toilets to the region increased the risk of epidemics. Inadequacies in the burial of the deceased led to the accumulation of corpses in open areas and the risk of epidemics. These problems created a great distrust in the society as to whether the aid reached its destination or not.
- After the disaster, serious mismatches and lack of co-operation emerged in repairing damage to transport networks, ports and airports. These gaps hampered access to transport services, which are vital for post-disaster crisis management. Hatay Airport was severely damaged and closed after the earthquake, Iskenderun Port suffered a chemical fire and main roads were damaged. In these areas, for which the Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure was responsible, municipalities belonging to opposition parties were not allowed to intervene due to lack of coordination, which delayed the repair of damages. The Ministry stated that it was carrying out the process itself, but did not include the contributions of local governments in its public statements. This situation deepened political polarisation.
- Serious incompatibilities and organisational problems were experienced in the process of foreign search and rescue teams reaching the earthquake zone and participating in the activities. After the Kahramanmaraş earthquake, the President of the Republic declared the highest level of alert, 4th degree alert, and called for international assistance. Search and rescue and health teams from 74 countries responded to this call. However, there were unplanned transportation of foreign teams from airports to disaster areas, teams were kept waiting for hours and response processes were delayed. Moreover, lack of interpreters and inadequate guidance led to communication problems and incompatibilities between Turkish and foreign teams negatively affected search and rescue operations. In particular, disagreements on debris removal decisions and increasing security problems in the region caused foreign teams to leave the region early.
- The lack of coordination in response services in the aftermath of the earthquake and the restriction of some social media platforms that expressed the problems caused by this lack of coordination hindered the right to information at the national level. Natural gas, drinking water, wastewater networks, electricity and communication systems were damaged in the earthquake zone, severely disrupting communications. These disruptions led to more intensive use of social media to share relief activities and basic needs. However, the Disaster Communication Group’s ‘band throttling’ restricted social media access for approximately 9.5 hours, which made it difficult for both the earthquake victims’ calls for help to be heard and for those who wanted to deliver aid to access information.
- In the aftermath of the disaster, the lack of coordination in humanitarian aid services was blamed on national aid organisations. When the main coordination institutions failed to meet the post-disaster needs in a timely manner, the gap was filled by aid organisations. Due to uncertainty about where earthquake taxes were spent and distrust in the government, citizens turned to aid organisations known for their reliability instead of state-organised campaigns. In this process, the aid organised by the Ahbap Association received widespread support and overshadowed AFAD’s campaigns in public opinion. As a consequence, harsh criticism and attempts to discredit the association emerged from some circles close to the government.
- The lack of coordination in the dispatch and administration of security forces in the earthquake zone led to an increase in security and public order problems. It is a priority task for crisis management to ensure security and order after the earthquake. However, some theft and looting incidents were attributed to foreign nationals, especially Syrians. This situation paved the way for social provocations and targeting of Syrians. Such allegations have the potential to create dangerous tensions at the national level and cause volunteers to leave the region due to security concerns.
- The fact that an important institution such as AFAD, the importance of which is once again recognised these days, does not assign duties according to merit and the person’s field of expertise shows the corruption in the state. Due to the great chaos in the disaster zone, all eyes have turned to AFAD, whose founding purpose is to prevent disasters, to respond effectively to disasters, to ensure coordination and cooperation between institutions and organisations. Established in 2009 under the Ministry of Interior, AFAD has been the focus of discussions and criticism after every disaster since its establishment. There were always question marks about the functioning of the institution, whether it employed enough specialised personnel, and whether all of these personnel were selected on merit. AFAD has actually demonstrated how justified the criticisms are with its own reports. On 23 November 2022, only 2.5 months before the great earthquake, AFAD prepared an analysis report on the 5.9 magnitude earthquake that occurred in Gölyaka district of Düzce. The report shows why AFAD fails in possible earthquakes, especially in the field of coordination. This report written by AFAD contains the self-criticism of the organisation. In summary, the report makes the following observations:
- coordination after the earthquake was not ensured,
- the wrong choice of assembly areas,
- tent tracking is not possible,
- there are problems with food distribution,
- teams were formed of teachers and imams instead of specialised staff,
- It was emphasised that the search and rescue personnel, inadequate in terms of quantity and quality, reached Düzce only after 2 days.
According to AFAD’s Performance Programme for 2022, AFAD has a total of 5843 full-time employees, 549 in the central organisation and 5294 in provincial directorates. The organisational structure of the provincial directorates divides the employees into 5 different service branches as advocacy, general administration, health, technical and auxiliary services. In addition to these service branches, there are permanent workers and provincial directorate staff. The number of employees in each service line is given in detail in the report. In 2022, the number of search and rescue technicians working full-time in AFAD is 1798. This figure constitutes 30.7 per cent of the total number of employees. This ratio shows the inadequacy of the number of search and rescue personnel, which is the most basic need of an organisation such as AFAD, whose main duty and field of activity is to combat disasters.
- The reason why the institution responsible for disaster management of the country is so inadequate lies in the incompetent caderisation, which is encountered in almost every institution. It is possible to see the merit problem through the provincial directors working in the provincial organisations of AFAD. Within the scope of this study, it was attempted to access the education and tenure information of provincial directors of AFAD in 81 provinces. Within the scope of the study, information on 65 provincial directors was accessed; no information could be found on 16 provincial directors. According to the examination and research conducted, only 15 of the 65 provincial directors have undergraduate education and training in earth science/construction and health sciences, which are directly related to search and rescue services. None of these 15 provincial directors are working in the earthquake zone. Out of the remaining 50 provincial directors, 38 of them graduated from the Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences of Anadolu University (it is considered by us that most of these provincial directors graduated from open education rather than formal education). For the remaining 12 provincial directors, no information could be accessed other than the fact that they have a bachelor’s degree. In other words, only 16 per cent of the 81 provincial directors in Türkiye have an education and experience related to search and rescue activities.
Instead of Conclusion
Earthquakes are one of the types of natural disasters that have the highest uncertainty rate and cause the most loss of life and property. Türkiye is a country under high earthquake risk and 96 per cent of its territory is under earthquake threat. 98 per cent of the population is directly or indirectly affected by this risk. Since the foundation of the Republic, more than 40 major earthquakes have been experienced and these earthquakes have caused serious loss of life and property. The 1939 Erzincan Earthquake and the 1999 Marmara Earthquake left deep traces in Türkiye’s earthquake history, causing thousands of people to lose their lives and hundreds of thousands of buildings to be damaged.
The earthquake on 6 February 2023, centred in Kahramanmaraş, was one of the biggest earthquakes of the last 150 years and again caused great destruction. In this earthquake, it was observed that great losses were experienced due to lack of coordination. This lack of coordination in the first three days of the earthquake once again revealed the inadequacy of the current disaster management system. In the 23 years since the 1999 earthquake, it is understood that the required progress in disaster management has not been achieved, on the contrary, coordination has weakened even more. The main reasons for this situation are bureaucracy without merit, presence of non-specialists in the administration, a system that prevents the flow of information and general lack of management. The elimination of these deficiencies necessitates urgent measures to prevent similar disasters in the future.
Based on the views of experts in the field of civil defence and disaster management, officials in the field, earthquake survivors and non-governmental organisations, this study presents a series of recommendations for building more resilient cities and societies in the fight against earthquakes.
Due to the ordinary period rules that are valid at the first moment of an earthquake in Türkiye, comprehensive legislation prepared for disasters should be implemented as a priority in a manner “free from political concerns”. Developed in 2009, the integrated disaster management legislation can be improved especially to ensure coordination in search and rescue activities. However, it is observed that this legislation is not effectively implemented in the implementation process. This situation leads to neglect and inadequate implementation of existing laws and regulations due to political influences, lack of merit and excessive centralisation.
The Emasya Protocol should be revised and put into force. This protocol should be revised in line with legal frameworks and should aim to ensure effective cooperation and coordination between the Ministry of Interior, related ministries and the Ministry of National Defence in natural disasters such as earthquakes, fires and floods. With such a co-operation, the areas of duty and authority should be clearly defined and responsibilities in these areas should be shared in line with the measures to be taken jointly. Especially in regions where major disasters such as earthquakes, floods and fires occur, utilising the response capacity of the Turkish Armed Forces, with the approval of the governorships depending on the size of the disaster, can play a critical role in restoring public order and ensuring effective disaster management.
In order to establish an effective response system against disasters, it is important to establish a structure based on merit. Proper selection of specialised personnel is of critical importance for the proper functioning of this system, ensuring coordination and success of management processes. Reduction of disaster risks is possible with an effective management mechanism. This mechanism should not be limited to public institutions and universities; it should be supported with the participation of non-governmental organisations, private sector and citizens.
Disaster risk management consists of three basic stages such as understanding the hazard, making preparations and reducing the risk. In this process, duties and responsibilities of all stakeholders should be clearly determined, sufficient budget should be allocated and sustainable management should be ensured. Disaster risk management takes place at international, national, regional and local levels. Decisions taken at these levels should be carried out with the participation of all stakeholders.
National disaster risk assessment can be realised by improving existing management mechanisms and involving civil society, private sector and public in this process. New mechanisms and tools should be developed in line with risk reduction targets, adequate budget should be provided and necessary database for disaster risk management should be established. In addition, management of risks, control of existing hazards and sectoral resilience should be improved. These activities should be integrated into national sustainable development plans.
In order to protect urban infrastructure and services against disasters, city administrations should develop a comprehensive disaster risk reduction strategy. The priority of this strategy should be the strengthening and protection of infrastructure facilities. The responsibility of protection of infrastructure belongs to public institutions and private sector which are the owners or operators of these facilities. In this respect, the identification of existing weaknesses and inadequacies is of critical importance. In particular, the focus should be on the protection and development of urban transport, energy, information and communication infrastructures.
The actions to be taken within the scope of urban disaster risk reduction strategy are as follows:
- Municipalities should receive expert support in this field by employing urban infrastructure protection specialists.
- The knowledge and experience of experts should be utilised to the maximum extent.
- Information sharing between cities should be encouraged and co-operation should be strengthened.
- Solidarity should be increased and joint action should be taken against urban disaster risks.
- Preventive and preparatory activities against terrorism and security risks should be emphasised.
- Urban disaster risk analyses should be regularly conducted and updated.
- Urban disaster risk and crisis management capacity should be continuously improved.
These steps will make cities more resilient against disasters and contribute to an effective management process in times of crisis.
In conclusion, it should be kept in mind that all kinds of changes and arrangements to be made in order to carry out an effective fight against disasters should be supported by every individual and every institution of the society. The impact of disasters is not only limited to individuals but also has a far-reaching effect on the whole society. Therefore, participation and co-operation of everyone is essential to increase resilience against disasters. It is not possible to fight against disasters successfully without the joint efforts of all stakeholders of
